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Monetary Schedule

The Halving

The block reward halves every 126,144,000 blocks — approximately once every four years. The reward is a deterministic function of block height, not a policy that can be revised. The cumulative supply is a geometric series whose limit is 21,000,000 CSM, approached asymptotically, never reached exactly.

01 · The Equation

Reward as a Function of Height

The block reward at height h is determined by a single equation. There is no committee, no vote, no adjustment parameter. The equation takes one input — the block height — and produces one output — the reward for that block. Every node computes it identically.

R(h)  = R0 · 2−⌊h / H⌋

Where R0 ≈ 0.08318123 CSM is the initial epoch reward and H = 126,144,000 is the halving interval in blocks. The floor function ⌊h/H⌋ is the epoch index — it increments by exactly 1 every H blocks, which triggers the halving.

At the block just before a halving, the reward is R0 / 2k. At the block just after, it is R0 / 2k+1. The difference is exactly a factor of two — a discontinuity that is written into the equation, not applied by any process.

02 · The Sum

Supply is a Geometric Series

The total supply after k full halving epochs is the sum of the rewards emitted in each epoch. Each epoch is a constant reward times a fixed block count. The sum across all epochs is a geometric series with ratio 1/2:

Supply(k)  = R0 · H · Σi=0k−1 2−i

As k → ∞, the geometric series converges to 2. Therefore:

limk → ∞  Supply(k)  =  2 · R0 · H ≈  21,000,000 CSM

The cap is not a parameter that was set to 21 million. It is the limit of a convergent series whose constants were chosen to yield approximately that value. The series approaches 21M from below — no epoch mints the final fraction. Even if the network ran forever, cumulative supply would never exactly equal 21M; it would approach it asymptotically.

Why This Matters

A policy-based cap can be changed by whoever controls the policy. A mathematical cap cannot — it is a consequence of the equation, not a decision. Any block whose coinbase exceeds R(h) is rejected by every honest node, not because a foundation says so, but because the transition function evaluates to invalid. The scarcity is a theorem, not a promise.

03 · The Schedule

Five Epochs, One Equation

The table below shows the first five epochs. Each row is derived from the same equation. The cumulative percentage approaches 100% asymptotically — the final row shows 96.875%, and each subsequent epoch adds roughly half of the remaining gap.

Epoch
Block Range
Reward / Block
Cumulative Supply
% of 21M
0
0 – 126,144,000
0.08318123 CSM
~10.5M
50%
1
126,144,000 – 252,288,000
0.04159062 CSM
~15.75M
75%
2
252,288,000 – 378,432,000
0.02079531 CSM
~18.375M
87.5%
3
378,432,000 – 504,576,000
0.01039765 CSM
~19.6875M
93.75%
4
504,576,000 – 630,720,000
0.00519883 CSM
~19.8438M
96.875%

Note: rewards and cumulative supply are shown rounded to 8 decimal places. The cumulative percentages are exact ratios (1/2, 3/4, 7/8, 15/16, 31/32). The cap converges to exactly 2·R₀·H, which is approximately 21,000,000 CSM.

04 · Miner Economics

Rewards Decline, Security Does Not

As block rewards halve, miners earn less from each block. But the security of the network is not measured in reward-per-block — it is measured in the total cost an adversary would need to produce a competing chain. That cost is dominated by the market price of CSM, not the emission rate.

In equilibrium, miners spend approximately the same value on mining as they earn from rewards and fees. As rewards halve, this equilibrium adjusts either through:

  • a higher CSM price (compensating for fewer coins per block), or
  • higher fees (as demand for block space grows), or
  • fewer miners (as marginal participants exit the market)
Security(t)  ∝ H(t) · price(CSM, t)

The network's hash rate H(t) and the market price of CSM together determine the cost to attack. If CSM's price appreciates faster than the emission rate declines, network security grows even as block rewards shrink. This is the same dynamic Bitcoin has operated on since 2012.

No Subsidy, No Bailout

When the emission ends (asymptotically), security will rest entirely on transaction fees. The protocol does not include an emergency emission adjustment, a tail-emission mechanism, or a security subsidy from any fund. Either fees are sufficient to sustain mining, or the network shrinks — there is no third option. This is by design: a subsidy would require an authority to administer it, and an authority is what the protocol exists to eliminate.

A halving is not an event. It is a consequence of an equation. The schedule was not decided — it was derived.
— Sahyadri